The stability arm of the surveyor over El Faro was not aware of several weight changes on board in the last few years, nor had they reviewed the most recent update of the ship’s cargo loading stability software.
Even if they had been told, though, they don’t believe the changes impacted stability.
As the Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation continues its probe of the ship's sinking, which killed 33 people, the former head of the American Bureau of Shipping's Loadline and Stability Group says they weren't notified about several changes they should have been called to review.
There are two weight change issues- one deals with the addition of some fructose tanks on El Faro in 2014.
“The weight change should have been submitted to ABS for our evaluation on behalf of the Coast Guard,” says Thomas Gruber, who is now an Assistant Chief Engineer for Statutes for ABS.
Suresh Pisini, who’s the Manager for ABS’ Structure and Statutes Group, says they were informed about the tanks, but he could only speak to the structure approval, not to why it was left out of the stability guidelines.
El Faro was also undergoing work while underway to prepare for an upcoming conversion to the Alaskan trade. While some prior witnesses have told the board they didn’t believe there was substantial weight on board or changes as a result of this conversion work, Gruber says they still should have known about it.
“The weight changes need to be submitted to ABS, whether or not the owner is doing that ahead of time we have no control over that. Until we’re notified that these changes are being added to the vessel, we can’t take action,” he says.
Investigators say the extent of the weight change that happened from the addition of the tanks was not reflected in El Faro’s “Trim and Stability” booklet or their CargoMax software. Gruber says the crew factored in the tanks as cargo, although not in the standard stability guidelines.
The "Trim and Stability" booklet gives the guidelines for El Faro specifically, based on the ship's design and subsequent modifications, like when she was extended in the 1990s. While a cargo supplement is not required, TOTE equipped El Faro with CargoMax software which measures the ship stability given all factors, including cargo loading. Shore side operations are also equipped with CargoMax. Gruber told the Board that ABS reviews and approves the software if it is on board.
The last version of CargoMax ABS had reviewed on El Faro was in 2007, and they approved it in early 2008. Investigators say the version El Faro had on board for her final voyage, however, was dated June 2010.
“That was never witnessed by an ABS surveyor, never went through the annual checks that the program on board has to go through,” Gruber says.
Several witnesses have told the Board there was a discrepancy in the readout from El Faro’s CargoMax and the real conditions. Those witnesses also said they spoke about the discrepancy frequently, but there were no written guidelines.
The question of ship stability- how it's calculated, measured, and attained- has been something investigators have frequently revisited through these hearings.
“From the perspective of weight change, was the addition of the fructose tanks significant for stability reasons?” asked ABS Attorney Jerry White, with Hill Rivkins.
“For the requirement of the stability test, it was not a deciding factor. It would not have required a new stability test or deadweight survey,” Gruber responded.
He says even when considering the aggregate weight of the tanks and the conversion work, it didn't amount to enough to impact the ship's stability. ABS' Vice President of Class Standards and Software Dan Cronin later told investigators that El Faro also had steel added in 2011 to mitigate corrosion on board. He believed the weight from those additions to also be not substantial.
This isn't the first time investigators have heard about ABS not getting proper notification. During the first hearing session, a TOTE Services Port Engineer confirmed he didn't notify surveyors about work to the lifeboat winches on El Faro the day she made her final departure. He says it was an "oversight" on his part.
Pisini says, at the time of the sinking, ABS was reviewing several design plans for El Faro- including work on davits and ramps. He wasn’t sure if the davits were for lifeboats or the ramps, or whether the design changes were a part of the Alaskan conversion. ABS says they would have to sign off on the plans before they were then handed to surveyors.
Gruber briefly addressed the impact of ramps on El Faro’s design- the way they were constructed left the ship with a “natural list”.
“At the time of the approvals, attention was not given to that. Currently, it’s some around to where we’re now paying attention to that,” Gruber says.
The American Bureau of Shipping is responsible for surveying El Faro and other commercial ships under the Coast Guard's "Alternate Compliance Program", which is a way to meet Coast Guard inspection standards while accounting for the work of independent class societies as well. The first CGMBI hearing session explored questions about the effectiveness of the inspection protocol and oversight of it. The Board will hear from more witnesses about that during the second week of this session.
WOKV will continue to follow the CGMBI. Get instant updates on Twitter.