A capsized lifeboat and life ring are among the limited debris which has been uncovered in the aftermath of the El Faro sinking which killed all 33 people on board.
The safety equipment on the ship and stability of the cargo she was carrying were addressed by people with direct knowledge to the special Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation Friday.
GALLERY: NTSB underwater footage of El Faro wreckage
Former El Faro Third Mate Alejandro Berrios, who now serves as Second Officer on the Isla Bella, had a few stints with El Faro, primarily including work with the safety protocols. Berrios told investigators he had detailed checklists- some weekly, some monthly- that occupied most of his time during the day. He would check life boats, life rafts, like jackets, immersions suits, and countless other areas. Berrios says any time there was a deficiency, it was immediately addressed.
In addition to his inspections, Berrios also played a role in weekly abandon ship drills carried out on board- which not just included the crew mustering to assigned lifeboats and lowering the boats to the embarkation deck, but gathering important equipment, like the EPIRB, to bring with them as well. Following these drills, Berrios says the crew would debrief- although the Captain only attended about 20% of those debriefs. William Bennet, who is representing the widow of Captain Michael Davidson, then questioned Berrios, who admitted that most of the drills happened while at sea- when Davidson was on the bridge.
Life jackets and immersion suits were stored in each stateroom, as well as a few other locations on board, according to Berrios.
GALLERY: Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation on El Faro sinking
Investigators questioned him specifically about the lifeboat davits, which needed repair on El Faro’s sister ship El Yunque. The El Yunque Captain said the davit problem was very difficult to find, and was immediately addressed when it was uncovered by a Coast Guard inspector. TOTE Services also testified that when the problem was found on El Yunque, they checked El Faro. Berrios was on board El Faro just a few days before she departed on what would become her fatal voyage, and says he had no reason to believe when he left that there was anything wrong with the safety equipment.
Anthony Callaway interacted with the El Faro as it left on its final voyage, in his role as Service Vessel Supervisor for PORTUS. PORTUS contracts with TOTE Services to load and secure the cargo on vessels owned by TOTE Maritime Puerto Rico, including the El Faro and El Yunque.
Callaway says he had about 70 employees loading cargo that day, and it was- by all accounts- business as usual. He says El Faro would call on Jacksonville once a week, so loading her had become routine. In fact, he was able to walk through a compartmentalized view of the ship with an NTSB investigator explaining how the cargo was strapped down for the voyage itself.
The lashings were a particular concern, with investigators asking how cargo was secured and if bad weather was a factor in that. Callaway says, in the last decade, PORTUS moved from lashing cargo based on anticipated good or bad weather to securing all cargo with the stronger “hurricane” lashing protocol. He says the decision means more work upfront, but protecting the cargo against potential popup storms.
Specifically on the El Faro and others in her class, Callaway says they sometimes are asked to leave a certain area “void” because of anticipated bad weather. His understanding is the area is voided not for any balance reason, but because there is a heavy flow in of water during bad weather, and that could damage the cargo- although he says that’s based on “old stories” and had never personally experienced cargo damaged in this way.
Ahead of the accident voyage, Callaway was not told to leave any area voided for bad weather, and in fact, said the El Faro was full.
He says much of the training his crew- as well as himself- have received has been on the job, and he wasn’t familiar with the lashing manual and another manual which an NTSB investigator showed him.
Callaway told investigators he never got any corporate pressure to load cargo quickly in order to meet a schedule. He further said there was enough time ahead of the El Faro’s final voyage that they were able to ensure the cargo was secure.
WOKV will continue to follow every minute of the Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation. You'll get instant updates on Twitter.